This paper addresses the approximation of belief functions by probability functions where the approximation is based on minimizing the Euclidean distance. First of all, we simplify this optimization problem so it becomes equivalent to a standard problem in linear algebra. For the simplified optimization problem, we provide the analytic solution. Furthermore, we show that for Dempster-Shafer belief the simplified optimization problem is equivalent to the original one. In terms of semantics, we compare the approximation of belief functions to various alternative approaches, e.g. pignistic transformation for Dempster-Shafer belief and Shapley value for fuzzy belief functions. For the later one, we give an example where the approximation method has some obvious statistical advantages. Additionally, for the approximation of additive belief functions, we can provide a semantical justification.
Introduction
The relation between belief and probability plays an important role in the theory of uncertain reasoning and its applications (see e.g. 1 ). Belief, e.g. as in DempsterShafer theory, can be viewed as an extension of probability. An advantage of a more general concepts of belief is the fact that such belief functions capture a wider rage of knowledge modeling aspects. Often a knowledge description is much more feasible by extended belief measures. For instance, Dempster-Shafer belief is related to incomplete information and it does not seem to be entirely straight forward to model all the aspects of incomplete information purely by a probability function. Probability theory, however, provides a well-established decision making theory, e.g. 2, 3 . In fact, it has been shown by using the so-called Dutch book argument that when applying belief functions different to probability, a rational decision making process can lead to completely irrational decisions, e.g. 4, 5 . A further advantage of probability functions is given in terms of its elegant 1 representation. Moreover, a probability function is completely determined by the belief values of the atoms of a finite propositional language or a finite σ-algebrawhich leads to significant advantages in terms of computational complexity. For such reasons different transformation methods have been developed. So far, DempsterShafer belief functions have been studied most extensively in this context 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 , but also transformation methods for fuzzy belief functions have been an issue 12, 13 . Roughly spoken, the existing transformation methods are based on the fact that the considered belief function can be interpreted by some formal model 10 . But how to proceed in situation where a belief function does not have a clear interpretation (e.g. because it reflects the intuition of a human expert)? Therefore, we introduce a geometric distance measure to belief functions and curiously analyze, whether a transformation method based on the geometric distance leads to reasonable results * . More precisely, this paper is concerned with the problem how a given belief function can be approximated by minimizing the Euclidean distance in the set of probability functions, i.e. we consider the following problem.
Optimization Problem (OP) For a given belief function Bel : SL → [0, 1] minimize the objective function θ∈SL Bel(θ) − P (θ) 2 with respect to a probability function P : SL → [0, 1]. Here and in the sequel, we view probability from the side of propositional languages instead from the side of σ-algebras. 16, 5 There, SL denotes the Lindenbaum algebra (i.e. the Boolean algebra of well-formed formulae, where two formulae are considered as equivalent if all their evaluations coincide) of a finite propositional language L with n propositional variables p 1 , . . . , p n .
The sum in (OP) is well-defined and finite, since the Lindenbaum algebra of a finite propositional language can only consist of a finite number of different equivalence classes of formulae.
For a rough architecture of this paper, we take the following structure. The first part is concerned with solving the given optimization problem. In fact this is the primary goal of our discussion. In the second part, we study some examples and make a comparison to alternative approaches, e.g. the pignistic transformation for Dempster-Shafer belief and the Shapley value for fuzzy belief.
Belief Functions
Definition 2.1 On the Lindenbaum algebra SL, the following ordering is defined: For all θ, ψ ∈ SL, * For various geometric approaches to belief functions see 14 and 15 . θ ≤ ψ if and only if θ |= ψ.
A formula α ∈ SL is called an atom of SL if and only if for each propositional sentence θ ∈ SL either α ≤ θ or α ≤ ¬θ holds.
Note that atoms uniquely correspond to conjunctions of the form
where the brackets indicate that each propositional variable may be prefixed with a negation or not. Therefore, J = 2 n different atoms exist for a language L with n propositional variables. Definition 2.2 A mapping V : SL → {0, 1} is called a valuation if and only if there exists an atom α ∈ At such that for all θ ∈ SL,
where At stands for the set of atoms of SL. Moreover, we denote the valuation induced by an atom α with V α .
Obviously, a valuation is a function that assigns a truth value to each formula in SL with the particular property that the truth values assigned to the propositional variables uniquely determine the truth value of any compound formula. 
In order to treat Dempster-Shafer belief functions in a similar way, we generalize the concept of valuations.
Definition 2.4 A mapping V : SL → {0, 1} is called an information function if and only if there exists a θ ∈ SL\{0} such that for all ψ ∈ SL,
where 0 denotes the equivalence class of contradictions. With V θ we want to denote the information function which is generated by θ.
The crucial difference between a valuation and an information function is given by the fact that an information function does not need to be generated by an atom. Information functions are closely related to the simple support functions defined by Shafer.
17 By using information functions, we are able to extend the definition of probability to Dempster-Shafer belief. 
Therefore, Dempster-Shafer belief functions are convex combinations of information functions (equivalent definitions can be found in the literature 16 ).
where
The considered belief function could be employed when a decision maker learns once about p 1 ∧ p 2 being true and once about the occurrence of p 1 ∨ p 2 . On the other hand, we would have got a probability function if a decision maker had learnt for instance p 1 ∧ ¬p 2 instead of p 1 ∨ p 2 . This had let to the probability function given by:
An extension of Dempster-Shafer belief leads to fuzzy belief which is a belief function satisfying monotonicity (i.e. for all θ, ψ ∈ SL, if θ |= ψ then F (θ) ≤ F (ψ)) and also F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, see e.g. 18, 19 . Later, we give an example (Example 6.3) where fuzzy belief functions are employed to represent the subjective belief of a human expert. Alternatively, fuzzy measures are currently widely applied in the theory of decision making , see e.g. 20, 21 . Some researches, however, seems to have the point of view that an application of fuzzy measures in belief representation is somehow artificial 22 and in fact we cannot deliver compelling arguments against that objection. Therefore, we keep our observations about fuzzy belief functions rather brief and focus on belief functions that can be justified somehow. 
For additive belief functions, we have generalized the definition of probability belief by dropping the condition that the belief values of the atoms sum up to one. This can be interpreted as follows, an expert wants to guess the belief values of the atoms out of her/his intuition. Then without any consistency enforcing questioning approach (see Example 2.3) it would be rather exceptional if the belief values summed up to one. But despite this fact, the expert carries on with her/his reasoning by applying additivity. How such an approached can be embedded into a decision making process without having to face possible Dutch book situations, we will explain in details in Example 6.4 and Example 6.5. But for a motivation let us have at least an impatient glance on the ideas already. 
. Clearly, such a guess does not lead to a probability belief function, but to an additive belief function. For this we take m A (α) = Bel(α) for all the atoms and m A (ψ) = 0 for ψ ∈ At. Furthermore,
for all θ ∈ SL. One possible approach, however, to transform the just obtained additive belief function into a probability function could be given by the method that solves the (OP).
From an intuitive point of view, one might find our just explained approach unnecessarily complicated. An alternative method seems to be much more natural where the given belief values are just normalizes, i.e.
We will show later (in Example 6.4) that such an attractive looking approach, which we call normalized transformation (see Definition 6.3), has a strong disadvantageous feature. There, we consider belief values as a random variable which has the sought probability value as its excepted value. For the normalizing procedure, it turns out that it does not preserve the excepted value, whereas the method that solves some weakened version of the (OP) does have this desired feature indeed.
A further important transformation method is obtained when one simply guesses all belief values of the atoms, apart from one atom. The very belief value of the left out atom which leads to a probability function is given by:
We will call such an approach the leave one out transformation, see Definition 6.4. As a matter of fact, for the above example the leave one out transformation simply does not work as always
like in Example 2.2 can be completely avoided by using the product rule from basic probability theory, i.e.
Bel(
Example 2.3 For L = {p 1 , p 2 }, we can insure consistency by asking an expert to give the values of Bel(p 1 |p 2 ), Bel(p 1 |¬p 2 ), and Bel(p 2 ) whereas the rest follows by applying Bel(¬p) = 1 − Bel(p) and the product rule:
Pushing things further in the direction of random variables, we will give an example at the very end of this paper (Example 6.5) that might favour the roundabout over the additive belief function. Here, advantages can be found in terms of statistical properties again. Intuitively, the statistical objections about applying the leave one out transformation seems to be somehow obvious when considering the fact that the leave one out transformation gives voluntarily away one available sample. Therefore, a strongly wrong guesswork is becoming much more likely. Additionally, a wrong guesswork is especially costly when the product rule is applied. For instance, a wrong estimation of Bel(p n ) effects the belief value of all atoms. Nevertheless, the leave one out transformation can be easily adapted in such a way that all the available belief values are employed and therefore the sample size is as large as possible (see Definition 6.5). Surprisingly or not, for additive belief functions it turns out that this approach is completely equivalent to the method that solves a slightly verified version of the (OP), see Lemma 6.1.
After this brief motivational comments, we want to come back to the definition of belief functions. In order to find a formal base for solving the optimization problem (OP) we need to introduce two further measures.
+ is a general belief function if and only if for all α ∈ At holds that Bel(α) ∈ [0, 1]. We denote the set of all general belief functions by GB. Any function g : SL → R + we call a general propositional function and we denote the set of all general propositional functions by GP .
Till now, we defined the belief functions (apart from the previous two) with this somehow artificial looking function m Bel : SL → R. In fact, m Bel : SL → R is the Möbius inverse mostly discussed in combinatorics (see e.g. 23 ) which allows a dualistic few on belief functions. In our analysis, we take a slight preference to examine the Möbius inverse of a belief function instead of examine the belief function itself. The reason for this is that in most cases the Möbius inverse gives an explanation about the construction and interpretation of belief functions. Additionally, the Möbius inverse makes our formal set up exceptional convenient when we connect the optimization problem (OP) with concepts from linear algebra, see Definition 3.2. Furthermore, the Möbius inverse is a handy tool to simplify proofs, see in particular Theorem 5.1. The next results, however, gives us an applicable formula to calculate the Möbius inverse of a general propositional function. 
The theorem above is well known (see e.g. 23 ) and shall complete our formal basic discussion about belief functions in this paper so that we can return to the optimization problem (OP). In the following section, a vector space structure is defined on the general propositional functions. In the vector space of general propositional functions, a slightly simplified version of the optimization problem (OP) turns out to be equivalent to projecting a vector into a subspace. such that for all θ ∈ SL, g 1 , g 2 ∈ GP and λ ∈ R, the operations ⊕, and are defined by
and O denotes the zero function O(θ) = 0. The inner product is defined by
The norm is uniquely given by the inner product in the usual way:
Obviously, GP is isomorphic to R 
is called the convex hull of {V 0 , . . . , V l } and
defines the affine hull of {V 0 , . . . , V l }.
From the definitions above, we see that the set of probability functions is the convex hull of all valuations and that the set of Dempster-Shafer belief functions is the convex hull of all information functions. The optimization problem (OP) formulated in the framework of GP is equivalently to: for a given belief function Bel ∈ GB, minimize the objective function Bel P with respect to
We proceed in the following way: First, we define an operator P * M on the set of all general belief functions. Then we show that P * M (Bel) ∈ A(V α0 , . . . , V α J−1 ) and, moreover, that P * M (Bel) solves the modified optimization problem given next.
Simplified Optimization Problem (SOP) For a given belief function Bel ∈ GB, minimize the objective function Bel P with respect to
is given by the fact that every affine hull is an affine subspace. Minimizing Bel P in a subspace of GP means that we look for the projection of Bel onto the subspace. A projection has the property that the projection vector stands perpendicular on the given subspace, i.e. the inner product of the projection vector and any vector of the subspace is zero. 24 The same holds true if we consider that linear subspace which is parallel to the affine one.
Finally, we show that even P * M (Bel) ∈ C(V α0 , . . . , V α J−1 ) holds for the case where Bel is a Dempster-Shafer belief function, i.e. P * M (D) indeed solves the (OP).
Solving the Simplified Optimization Problem (SOP)
Definition 4.1 For Bel ∈ GB, the formula
defines the projective transformation in terms of the Möbius inverse of Bel :
where S θ = {α ∈ At | α ≤ θ}, i.e. the set of atoms from which θ can be inferred of. Consequently, |S θ | denotes the cardinality of this set.
First, we show that P *
Proof. We have to show that α∈At m P * M (Bel) (α) = 1. By inserting the definition of m P * M (Bel) , we obtain
and also, α∈At θ>0
which completes the proof.
The crucial step is the following lemma. It provides the basis for proving that P * M (Bel) solves the (SOP).
Proof. Since ., . is bilinear, it suffices to show that
Starting with the left-hand side of the equation, it is necessary to consider that V α l , V α k is the number of elements of SL which are greater than or equal to
Therefore, by the definition of m P * M (Bel) ,
Thus, we get the following:
For the right-hand side of Equation 1, we need to consider that V α , V θ is the number of elements of SL which are greater or equal than α ∨ θ. Therefore,
For a further simplification, we separate SL\{0} into four pairwise disjoint subsets:
Then, we can conclude further
When we compare this with the first part of the proof, it holds in fact
, Bel which is the required result. An alternative way to prove Theorem 4.1 can be based on using Lagrange multipliers.
10 Next, we derive the projection formula for the belief function itself and not for its Möbius inverse. There, we just repeat the ideas of the previous proofs (an alternative approach should be possible by applying the Möbius Theorem 2.1).
Definition 4.2 For
Bel ∈ GB, the formula
defines the projective transformation of Bel, where for all α ∈ At,
GB (Bel) (θ) = 0 whenever θ is not an atom.
Analogously to Lemma 4.1, it can be shown that P * GB (Bel) is a member of the affine hull of valuations and, analogously to Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.1, we can prove that P Proof. It is to shown that α∈At m P * GB (Bel) (α) = 1
Next, we show that P * GB (Bel) solves the (SOP).
Theorem 4.2 P *

GB (Bel) solves the (SOP).
Proof. With the same argument as in Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.1, P * GB (Bel) solves the (SOP) if it can be shown that V α k V α0 , P * GB (Bel) Bel = 0 which is equivalent to V α k V α0 , P * GB (Bel) = V α k V α0 , Bel , for any k ∈ {1, . . . , J − 1}. Following the ideas of Lemma 4.2,
Therefore,
Essentially, the projection function defined for a belief function gives exactly the same result as the projection function given by the Möbius transformation of a belief function. This is due to the fact that both are unique solutions of the (SOP). Proof. Theorem 4.1 states that P * M uniquely solves the (SOP ) for any given general belief function. The previous theorem states that P * GB uniquely solves the (SOP) for any given general belief function. Hence, P * M (Bel) = P * GB (Bel). According to the last result, the indices of P * M and P * GB are skipped form now on and we just write P * (Bel) instead.
When (OP) ≡ (SOP)?
In the previous section, we solved the (SOP). Next we want to show that we did not go to far, when we simplified the original optimization problem (OP). This holds at least for Dempster-Shafer belief.
. . , V α J−1 ) and, therefore, solves the optimization problem (OP).
Proof. Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 declare that P * (D) solves (SOP)
. In order to show that P * (D) solves the (OP), too, it remains to proof additionally that P * (D) ∈ C(V α0 , . . . , V α J−1 ), i.e. that for all α ∈ At the inequality P * (D)(α) ≥ 0 holds. Suppose that for some atom α ∈ At the opposite P * (D)(α) < 0 is the case. Then, by Definition 4.1,
Since the function f : N → Q with f (i) = i · 2 −i has a maximum for i = 1,
However, θ>0 m D (θ) = 1 and 2 −n = J −1 which gives the required contradiction. Hence, P * (D)(α) ≥ 0 for all α ∈ At must hold. Therefore,
Unfortunately, such a result does not hold for any kind of belief functions. In fact, for the additive belief function it is possible to construct a counter example.
Before doing so, we simplify the projective transformation formula for this very case.
Proposition 5.1 Let
be an additive belief function then the according projective transformation,
is given by
for all α ∈ At.
Proof. By Definition 4.1
Example 5.1 For suppose |L| = 2. The considered additive belief function shall be given as follows in this example:
So we have:
Hence, P * (A) ∈ C(V α0 , . . . , V α J−1 ).
Discussion and Comparison
Finally, we want to analyze the theoretical and practical relevance of the projection method. Moreover, the projection method shall be compared to various alternative transformation methods. Let us first apply the projective transformation to Dempster-Shafer belief. There, the upcoming example shows some limitations of the projective transformation and explains the justification for an alternative method, the pignistic transformation. 
and, therefore, |S p1∨p2 | = 3. Then for α ∈ S p1∨p2 the projective transformation leads to the following result:
Since P * (D) is a probability function α∈At m P * (D) (α) = 1 which implies that m P * (D) (¬p 1 ∧ ¬p 2 ) = 1 16 for the remaining fourth atom. Here, D : SL → [0, 1] is simply the information function V p1∨p2 which can be interpreted in the way that an expert knows for sure that p 1 ∨ p 2 and all its semantic consequences are true. Now, let us briefly discuss this result in a practical scenario: for suppose that a stock broker analyzes two companies about their future profitability. She/he knows that an airline will place a very lucrative order to these companies. The possible situations are that exactly one of the two companies gets the order or both companies are asked to handle the order together. The stock broker could describe such a situation with V p1∨p2 (like in the example above). If she/he was asked to draw an as specific conclusion as possible, she/he would certainly choose one of the atoms ¬p 1 ∧ p 2 , p 1 ∧ ¬p 2 , p 1 ∧ p 2 , but the broker would always decide against ¬p 1 ∧ ¬p 2 to describe the situation. In this context, it is quite questionable that the projective transformation takes a non-zero value for the belief value of ¬p 1 ∧ ¬p 2 .
For the situation described in Example 6.1, the pignistic transformation due to Smets gives a much clearer result 7, 25 (other methods have been developed, sacrificing somehow semantic clarity for advantages in terms of computational complexity 6, 8, 9 ). Definition 6.1 Let D ∈ GB be a Dempster-Shafer belief function with
Of course, the pignistic transformation defines a probability function, see 7 .
Example 6.1 (continued) Applying the pignistic transformation to the Dempster-Shafer belief function of the first part of this example, we obtain
for α ∈ S p1∨p2 and m P (D) (¬p 1 ∧ ¬p 2 ) = 0. 1/3 is also the probability that the stock broker chooses some α ∈ S p1∨p2 .
The pignistic transformation has been well-justified (see e.g. 26, 10 ) and in this sense we want to give an example that favours the pignistic method in comparison to the projective method even stronger.
Example 6.2 As in Example 6.1, the stock broker wants to describe the future profitability of two companies. She/he knows that the first company or the second company is meant to get the very lucrative order of an airline, but she/he does not know which company in particular. Additionally, she/he learned that a similar order was already placed once in the past and there both companies were asked to handle the order together. This situation could be formalized by relative frequencies as follows: The representation of the expert's knowledge after receiving the first information is equivalent to the evaluation derived by
. Afterwards, the expert learns about p 1 ∨ p 2 being true, which leads to the Dempster-Shafer belief function given by:
Applying the projection method leads to
. Which means that the information of p 1 ∨ p 2 being true leads to a decrease of the belief value in p 1 ∨ p 2 . Clearly, such a result flies in the face of common sense and definitely favours the pignistic method. † In the Examples 6.1 and 6.2 the belief function are defined by the relative frequency of information functions. Alternatively to a relative frequency interpretation, it is popular in uncertain reasoning to define a belief function by an expert's subjective opinion. 16 In probabilistic uncertain reasoning, an expert makes a few statements about some possible event and the remaining values of a belief function are deduced by inference processes. Anyway, but how an expert should approach the task of guessing an entire belief function. First of all, we consider the least elegant case where an expert guesses all the belief values on the entire Lindenbaum algebra explicitly without using the fact that guessing the belief values of the atoms would completely suffice. For this approach, we briefly want to compare the projective transformation with already existing methods. If we assume that the expert's guesswork would lead to a fuzzy belief function (i.e. belief functions that satisfy monotonicity, F (0) = 0, and F (1) = 1) the most widely discussed transformation method is the ShapleyValue 12,13 . Nevertheless, fuzzy belief functions are not generally accepted in such a context (see e.g. 22 ), as it is more applicable to guess the belief values of the atoms only. Guessing procedures that are restricted on the belief values of the atoms will be considered afterwards. Definition 6.2 Let F : SL → R be a fuzzy belief function then the Shapley-value is given by:
for all ψ ∈ At and m P S (F ) (ψ) = 0 otherwise. Consequently, we want to denote the belief function generated by the Shapley value with P S (F ), i.e.
Additionally, we want to define a fuzzy belief function by using the probability function P ∅ (θ) = |θ| 4 . The analysis become more convenient when noticing that P S (P ∅ ) = P ∅ and P * (P ∅ ) = P ∅ (this is easily verified for the particular case of |L| = 2). The analyzed fuzzy belief functions are defined as follows:
otherwise. † It might be interesting in this context to compare Dempster-Shafer belief to principles of inductive logic and for this example in particular with the principle of instantial relevance, see e.g. 27 .
Obviously, monotonicity is insured, i.e. θ |= ψ always implies F i (θ) ≤ F i (ψ). We get the following result for α 3 when applying the Shapley value to the first fuzzy belief function:
For α 3 , the Shapley value of the second fuzzy belief function returns:
In the same way, the projection method leads to the result:
. It is then obvious that the result of the projection method is closer to the probability function P ∅ (θ) = |θ| 4 then the transformation done by the Shapley value. Such circumstances are best expressed by random variables and in terms of basic statistics what will actually come next.
We want to interpreted the just acquired result in such a way that a belief function is more or less viewed as an unbiased estimator of a sought probability function. Roughly spoken, unbias means here that in average the estimator takes the very value that one is looking for. Estimators are, however, a crucial concept of basic statistics and likewise there two aspects are important to us. First of all, we are interested whether the Shapley value and the projective transformation preserve the unbias character of an estimator. Secondly, the variance matters to us in such a way that the lower the variance, the better is the estimator. 15 for richer distributions on such random variables) then we trivially get
And calculating the expected value of the Shapley value leads to the same result:
Thus, as desired, the Shapley value preserves the expected value of the given belief functions. Next, we check for variance:
We repeat the same procedure for the projective transformation. There was given that P * (F 1 )(α 3 ) = Hence, V ar(P * (F )(α 3 )) < V ar(P S (F )(α 3 )).
Last, the additive belief functions get our intention. As already mentioned in Example 2.2, the most simple way of guessing a belief function is obtained by guessing the belief values of the atoms only. Most likely, for such a guesswork the belief values of the atoms might not sum up to one. In these cases, a natural transformation methods arises by just normalizing the estimated belief values. Definition 6.3 Let Bel : SL → R be a general belief function such that at least for one α ∈ At, Bel(α) > 0. Then the general propositional function
It is trivial to show that P N (Bel) is a probability belief function For our discussion, the upcoming result is crucial. In the following example, we show that the normalized transformation does not preserve the expected values.
Example 6.4 For L = {p}, we want to take P (Bel(¬p) = Which is equivalent to
Hence, the expected value of P N (Bel)(¬p) is given by Nevertheless, there are various alternative transformation methods where the expected value is preserved. For the first transformation method of this type, we construct an additive belief function out of the guessed belief values (like in Example 2.2). Then, the obtained additive belief function can be transformed by the projection method.
Example 6.5 For an additive belief function, Proposition 5.1 provides the transformation formula:
We want to consider again the randomly estimated belief values: P (Bel(¬p) = For the preparation of the projective transformation, we construct an additive belief function by taking m A (α) = Bel(α) for all α ∈ At. Then:
Hence,
In the same manner, P (P * (A)(¬p) = Finally, we want to compare the result of the previous example with the transformation method where J − 1 atoms are guessed by an expert and the remaining atom gets the belief values that is required to ensure α∈At m Bel (α) = 1. Definition 6.4 Let Bel : SL → R be a general belief function then the function
is the leave one out transformation of Bel : SL → R.
The advantages of this transformation are that it preserves the expected value and the expert has to guess the belief values of the atoms only. One disadvantage is 
In the above example, the projection methods is clearly advantageous in terms of variance. Despite this fact, the result does not convincingly favour the projective transformation. If we had left out the first atom instead of the second one then the leave one out transformation would be just perfect, i.e. V ar(P (L(0)) (Bel)(¬p)) = V ar(P L(0) (Bel)(p)) = 0. So, the result depends highly on the fact which atom is left out. In order to avoid such differences, nothing seems to be more natural then taking the average of all possible leave one out transformations. Definition 6.5 Let Bel : SL → R be a general belief function then the average leave one out transformation is given by:
Example 6.5 (continued) For the language L = {p}, the possible leave one out transformation methods are:
and
Taking the average of this two probability functions then this leads to So, the projective transformation applied to additive transformation methods has a clear justification.
Concluding Remarks
The main aspect of our discussion was the optimization problem (OP). Firstly, we re-formulated the set of belief functions within the framework of a linear space. Secondly, we simplified the optimization problem to the (SOP), so the given task could be interpreted as a projection of a vector into an affine hull. As the main result of our work, we consider the fact that we found the analytical solution of the (SOP), i.e. the projective transformation.
Having found the projective transformation formula, we were primarily interested in two questions. Firstly, when is (OP)≡(SOP)? Secondly, can the projective transformation compete with already existing transformation methods?
We could show the equivalence of the (OP) and the (SOP) for Dempster-Shafer belief functions indeed. The outcome of the Examples 6.1 and 6.2 , however, suggests that in the context of Dempster-Shafer belief, there are some limitations of the pure geometric interpretation of a transformation method. The pignistic transformation by Smets seems to be semantically stronger. For a further sematical comparison, we also interpreted belief functions as a random guesswork of a human expert. There, we assumed that a belief function is an unbias estimator of a sought probability function. For such an interpretation, the Examples 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 point out that the projective transformation preserves the expected value and furthermore leads to estimators of low variance. Moreover, the guessing procedures where of particular interest which require to guess the belief values of the atoms only. Here, the leave one out transformation was the only candidate that could compete with the projective transformation, but also there Example 6.4 indicated that the projective transformation seems to be advantageous. In our ambition to improve the leave one out transformation in terms of variance, the average leave one out transformation naturally arose. As a semantic interpretation of the (SOP) for additive belief functions, we could show the equivalence between the projective transformation and the average leave one out transformation.
Overall, the projective transformation should be applicable in situations, where the belief function is in average the sought probability function and there the projective transformation seems to have strong statistical properties. For belief function that are not in average the sought belief function (e.g. Dempster-Shafer belief) the projective transformation is possibly not appropriated.
For further work, several aspects of research arose in our analysis. First of all, it should be feasible to solve the (OP) at least for additive belief functions. Also, it might be possible to show (OP ) ≡ (SOP ) not only for Dempster-Shafer belief functions. Here, the fuzzy belief function is an attractive looking candidate. Furthermore, it should be useful to derive the projective transformation for measures defined on σ-algebras instead on propositional languages. Last, but not least it should be of further interest to deepen the statistical analysis of the guessing procedures.
